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PUBLIC ORDER AND THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY IN
ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
WITHOUT the right of assembly, guaranties of free speech are empty ges-
tures; for if no public forum is available, the right to speak freely is of little
value. Nevertheless the right of assembly is subjected to varied restrictions
both in England and America. Some have evolved from judicial interpreta-
tion of "the" common law; others are crystallized in statutes. These restric-
tions have generally been made in the name of public order. They seek to
avoid disturbance by punishing conduct 'hich, it is thought, if allowed to
continue, might endanger the public peace.
The purpose is worthy. Its execution is fraught with danger to civil
liberty. Since there can be no objective standard for determining whether
any particular conduct, if unchecked, will cause a breach of the peace, the
initial judgment will. be made by a policeman. Even if the charges he prefers
are dismissed, the decision will have come too late; speech will have been
prevented.
Because such restrictions in the name of public order provide the law-
enforcement agencies with broad discretion, they offer convenient legal
weapons for curbing the activities of unpopular minorities - minorities whose
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politics, in the past at least, have usually been to the left of those of the
ruling party. But the recent growth of Fascist and Nazi groups in England
and the United States has brought forth legislation, or demands for legis-
lation, to restrain these groups on the right. In England, they style them-
selves, British Union of Fascists, or "Blackshirts." Under the leadership of
Sir Oswald Mosley, England had witnessed the rise of uniformed troops,
dedicated to the eradication of Jews and Communists and the establishment
of a Fascist dictatorship for Britain.' Grave danger to public order from
the activities of Mosley's Blackshirts was long brewing; it culminated in the
fall of 1936 with serious violence in the Jewish quarter of London. Jews
were verbally abused and threatened; occasionally injured. Their shop
windows were broken and stores raided. Counter-attacks and marches were
organized; streets were barricaded.2 The East End of London was rapidly
developing into an armed camp.3 Liberals and other anti-Fascists demanded
that the police take action.4 The Government maintained that existing laws
were insufficient to cope with the situation. Therefore, in opening Parlia-
ment in November, the King announced that his ministers had concluded
"that the existing law requires amendment in order to deal more effectively
with persons or organizations who provoke or cause disturbances of the
public peace ;" but that such an amendment would not interfere "with legiti-
mate freedom of speech or assembly. ' 6
The result was the Public Order Act of 1936.i Allegedly designed to
strike at Mosley and his men,8 the principal provisions of the Act not only
prohibit the wearing of political uniforms and the organization of quasi-
1. See, generally, MOSLEYv, FAscism N BRrTAuN (paraph. 1933); Drennan, B. U.
F. (1934); RuLIN, GROWTH OF FAscism ur GREAT BnrrAiN (1935).
2. See the vivid description by Mr. Herbert Morrison, reported in 309 H. C. Din.
(5th Ser. 1936) 1595-1603; The Times, Oct. 12, 1936, p. 14, col. e; p. 11, col. c.
3. Initially, the Government attempted to deal with the situation by prohibiting a
Fascist march through the East End of London. See id., Oct. 5, 1936, p. 9, col. a;
p. 12, coL e.
4. See Remarks of Mir. Herbert Morrison, cited mspra note 2; The Times, Oct. 9,
1936, p. 16, col c; id., Oct. 17, 1936, p. 17, col. c; id., Oct. 13, 1936, p. 12, cols a, b (let-
ter froin Herman Finer); id., Oct. 22, p. 13, col. b ("Liberal call for State action").
5. See speech of Sir John Simon, then Home Sec'y, reported in The Times, Oct.
8, 1936, p. 7, col. d.
6. See 103 H. L. DEB. (5th ser. 1936) 4.
7. 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 6, hereafter cited as "the Act." Section 10 (3) pro-
vides that the Act shall take effect on Jan. 1, 1937. It applies to Scotland with certain
modifications not discussed herein [§ 8], but does not apply to Northern Ireland. § 10 (2).
For a useful but uncritical treatise on the Act, see BAnun, LAw oP PorrrzcAL Ur-
FORMS, PUBLc MEETNGS AxD PRrVATn ARnrms (1937); see also Cam';, LAw RMATLn
To PUBLIC MEnrrxGs & PRocEssboNs (1937).
& Although the Government never frankly conceded this, numerous Members of
Parliament intimated they "would like a crack at the Fascists." See Remarks of Mr.
Maxton, reported in 318 H. C. DEB. (5th ser. 1936) 1763-4. See also id. at 1693; 317
H. C. Dm (5th ser. 1936) 1388, 1440, 1456.
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military organizations, but also enjoin both public parades under certain
conditions and "insulting" words or behavior.0 The Act can thus be employed
to restrict the activities of political minorities of the left as well as those of
the right.
In the United States undoubtedly there is as yet no organization compar-
able in size or in influence to the British Union of Fascists at the time that
the Public Order Act was passed. There are, however, sundry Nazi and
Fascist groups whose present tactics demonstrate potentialities for future
activities not unlike those of Mosley's Blackshirts. 10 Indeed the Nazi-Ameri-
cans, it is said, not only wear uniforms, but also conduct drills with fire-
arms." Although there is at present no single piece of legislation in the
United States similar to the Public Order Act, there are numerous statutes
and ordinances which have been, and are being, applied to restrict the activi-
ties of leftist groups. It may be expected that they will be employed against
Nazi organizations in the future. In addition, new legislation may be enacted
to cope with the novel techniques employed by these groups.
12
The enactment of the Public Order Act and the possibility of similar legis-
lation in the United States suggest a comparative study of the restrictions on
the right of assembly in England and the United States.
STREET MEETINGS
England. No one knows whether it is lawful in England to hold a meeting,
however orderly, on the public streets.13 It is settled that obstructions of the
highway are unlawful under the Highways Act, 1835,J 4 and that every street
meeting constitutes at least a technical obstruction.', It would seem, there-
fore, that "the only right which a subject possesses in the highway is the
9. For a detailed survey and evaluation of corresponding legislation in continental
countries, see Loewenstein, Militant Democracy & Fundamental Rights (1937) 31 Am.
PoT_ ScI. REv. 417, 638, 644-656.
10. See HoKE, SHIRTS! (Am. Civ. Lib. Union pamph., 1934); Hanighen, Foreign
Political Movements in the U. S. (1937) 16 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1; Shipler, Fascist Threat
to America (1937) THE CHURcHMAN, Feb. 1, 1937, p. 14, cont. Feb. 15, 1937, p. 9;
concl'd March 1, 1937, p. 14; Dinneen, An American Fiihrer Organizes an Army (1937)
AmERICAN MAGAziNE, August, 1937, p. 14; H. R. REI. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1935) 3-12 (Report of Committee to Investigate Nazi and other Propaganda).
11. See H. R. REP. No. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935) 11.
12. The inhabitants of Southbury, Conn., have already taken action against Nazi-
Americans by passing a zoning ordinance "restricting as 'farming and residence dis-
trict', the area which includes the . .. site" proposed by the German-American Bund
for the establishment of a camp. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1937, p. 26, col. 2.
13. See, generally, DicEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW Or THE CoN-
STITUTION (8th ed., 1915) 266-279.
14. 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 50, § 72.
15. See Remarks of Mr. Dingle Foot, M. P., reported in 314 H. C. DEn. (5th set.
1936) 1596; Goodhart, Public Meetings & Processions (1937) 6 CAmD. L. J. 161, 163; cf.
Smith, J., in Homer v. Cadman, 54 L. T. (m.s.) 421, 422 (Q. B. 1886).
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right to pass and repass;" any other use constitutes a "trespass."' 1 And
while the law "usually . . . is not rigidly enforced,"117 there is no modem
reported decision clearly holding that it is either prima facie lawful or un-
lawful to hold a meeting in the streets.18 It thus lies in the arbitrary power
of the police to disperse a street meeting on no other ground than that the
meeting constitutes an obstruction of the streets,'0 and the charge is made
that this device is frequently employed as a weapon against unpopular political
minorities.
20
Although this offense serves as a vehicle for dispersion, others are fre-
quently resorted to. Under various Parliamentary grants of power to regu-
late the use of the streets, local governmental subdivisions have passed
numerous bye-laws prohibiting the holding of meetings or the playing of
musical instruments in the streets, without first securing a permit from the
proper authorities. Attacked on the ground that they are unreasonable and
therefore ultra vires, and occasionally on the further ground that they are
fatally indefinite, these ordinances have been upheld in the majority of
cases.
2 1
The legitimate purpose of these laws, if any, is the prevention of undue
interference with street traffic and the suppression of unseemly noises. Other
weapons for curbing street meetings have as their ostensible purpose the
preservation of public order, and can thus be employed only in a more limited
sphere. The most ancient of such devices is that of unlawful assembly.
Contrary to the opinion of most commentators, the common law definition
16. Jennings, Public Order (1937) 8 POLITICAL QJA1TEIILY 7, at 17.
17.' Ibid.
18. The courts have indicated some reluctance to declare a meeting on a public street
unlawful per se. In a private prosecution under the Public Meeting Act, 19i3 (8 Edw.
7, c. 66) for disturbing a meeting held on a public street where the trial court had dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that a meeting on a highway was ipso facto un-
lawful, the appellate court reversed, saying: The court had ". . . no right to assume
that, simply because the meeting was held on a highway it could" not be a lawful meet-
ing. Burden v. Rigler [1911] 1 K. B. 337, 340 (meeting of Tariff Reform League).
In Aldred v. Miller, [1924] Sess. Cas. 117 (Ct. of Justiciary) (lecturer), Lord Sands
said at 121: "When meetings in such places [i.e., the highways] are customary, they
are not interfered with. On the other hand, ... if they cause an obstruction, they are
an offence."
19. See Back v. Holmes, 56 L T. (N.s.) 713 (Q. B. 1887) (hymn singer); Homer
v. Cadman, 54 L. T. (N.s.) 421 (Q. B. 1886) (Salvationist lecturer).
20. See Barrister, Police & Their Powers (1936) 12 N-w STAx s:An & NATnoi
80, at 81.
21. Cases sustaining the ordinances: Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q. B. 83 (church
revival meeting) ; Reg. ex rel. Gay v. Powell, 51 L. T. (.N.s.) 92 (Q. B. 1884) (music
by Salvation Army); Slee v. Meadows, 75 J. P. 246 (K. B. 1911) (Salvation Army lec-
ture). Contra: Johnson v. Mayor of Croyden, 16 Q. B. D. 703 (18%) ; Mfunro v. Vat-
son, 57 L. T. (N.s.) 366 (Q. B. 1887) (Salvation Army singer). In the last case
Mathew, J., said: "Permission to the mayor to license such music as he may see fit is
an additional objection to the bye-law." Id. at 367.
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of this misdemeanor has undergone a decided expansion within the last
three centuries. 22 Probably originating in the Star Chamber,23 this offense
was defined early in the seventeenth century by the chronicler of that body
as the assemblage of two or more persons together "to do some unlawful
thing" "in terrorein populi,"24 which disperses, or is dispersed, before the
"unlawful thing" has been accomplished.25
But approximately a century after this definition was written, Hawkins,
with neither unanimous nor compelling supporting authority,20 asserted in
a definition frequently quoted judicially, that the ancient definition was "much
too narrow."' 27 He maintained that an unlawful purpose in the assembly
was not a necessary element of the offense.2 8 "For any meeting whatsoever
of great numbers of people with such circumstances of terror as cannot but
endanger publick peace, and raise fears and jealousies among the king's
subjects" constitutes an unlawful assembly.
29
Doubt was cast on this doctrine by the famous case of Beatty v. Gillbanks
decided in 1882. It was there held that an assembly is not unlawful merely
because the opponents of those holding the meeting propose to attack it,
22. See Jarrett & Mund, The Right of Assembly (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 1,
6; 5 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1937) 198-9; but see Comment
(1935) 23 CALIF. L. Ray. 180, 183. Dicey hinted at this expansion when he said: "...
the rules defining the right of public meeting are the result of judicial legislation, and
* . . the law which has been created may be further developed by the judges." DIcay,
op. cit. supra note 13, at 501. Also significant is the fact that it was not until the sixth
edition of his treatise (publ. 1902) that the chapter on "The Right of Public Meeting"
contained sections discussing limitations on that right as originally defined in the first
edition (publ. 1885).
23. 5 HoLDSwoRTH, op. cit. supra note 22, at 198.
24. HUDSON, TREATISE OF THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER (1635) printed in 2 CoL-
LECTANEA JURIDICA (1791), at 82-85. In LAMBARD, EIRENARCHIA (1619) at 175, the
definition is similar. But later on he casts doubt on the necessity for proving "an un-
lawfull thing," saying at 177: ". . . . the lawfulnesse or unlawfulnesse of the thing
it selfe that is done or intended, doth not always excuse or accuse the parties to [a Riot,
Rout, or Unlawful] Assembly . . .The manner of the doing of a lawfull thing may
make it unlawfull." But in DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTIcE (1715) an "unlawful act"
is said to be a necessary element of the crime of unlawful assembly. Id. at 320.
25. HuDsoN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 82. He defines riot as an assemblage of two
or more "to do an unlawful thing and do it . . .in terrorein populi." Id., 82-85.
26. See cases cited infra note 28.
27. 1 HAWK., P. C. (1st ed. 1715) at *297.
28. Howard v. Bell, Hob. 91 (Star Chamber, 1619). Contra, however, is Holt, C. J.,
a century later in Queen v. Solely, 11 Mod. 100 (K. B. 1707), at 101: "Surely it [i.e.,
the indictment] ought to be laid, that the assembly came together to do an unlalpful act."
29. 1 HAWK., P. C., *297. Hawkins then cites as a hypothetical example a case
"where great numbers, complaining of a common grievance, meet together, armed in
a warlike manner in order to consult together concerning the most proper means for
the recovery of their interests." Yet in 1820 in Rex v. Hunt, 1 St. Tr. (N.s.) 171 it
was held that the element of being "armed in a warlike manner" was not an essential
element of the offense.
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thus endangering the public peace.30 But within the next decade all doubts
on this score should have been dispelled, for in Regina v. Graham, Charles, J.,
relied specifically on the Hawkins definition in his charge to the jury. He
further stated: "An unlawful assembly is an assembly of persons with the
intention of carrying out any common purpose, . . . lawful or unlawful,"
so as to give courageous bystanders "ground to apprehend a breach of the
peace in consequence of it."3'
The charge of unlawful assembly as a device for curbing street meetings
appears to have given way in popularity to the statutory offense under the
Metropolitan Police Act, 1839, and other local acts, of using "threatening,
abusive or insulting words or behaviour . . . whereby a breach of the peace
may be occasioned. ' 32 The police may have found this offense more ad-
vantageous than that of unlawful assembly, since proof of a common purpose
in an assemblage of at least three persons is not an essential of the offense;
the proof need only look to the conduct of a single defendant. Furthermore,
the judges have brought their interpretation of these statutes into line with
the expanded doctrine of unlawful assembly. Thus, in Wise v. Dunning the
court held that even though a person did not "incite" others to commit a
breach of the peace-an unlawful act3 -his conduct is proscribed if its
"natural consequence" would have been to have caused others to breach the
peace, had he been permitted to continue.
3
1
The offense was reenacted as Section Five of the Public Order Act, but
with substantial additions. First, the offense is extended to all England and
Scotland; second, the penalty is increased from a fine of forty shilling to
imprisonment on summary conviction for a term not exceeding three months
and/or to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.35
30. See Beatty v. Gilibanks, 9 Q. B. D. 303 (18,82) (Salvation Army meeting at-
tacked by "Skeleton Army"); DicEY, op. cit. supra note 13 at 270-2. In the Beally case,
Field, J., said at 314: "There is no authority for . . . a proposition" "that a man may
be convicted for doing a lawful act if he knows that his doing it may cause another
to do an unlawful act." See also Queen v. Justices of Londonderry, 28 L. R. Ir. 440, 450,
461-2. (Q. B. 1891) (Salvation Army parade).
31. Reg. v. Graham, 16 Cox C. C. 420, 427 (N. P., 1883) (demonstration in Tra-
falgar Sq. to demand release of "Irish patriots"--id. at 424).
32. 2 and 3 Vict., c. 47, § 54 (13). The police acts in most of the larger towns
contain similar provisions. See Barrister, Insulting Words & BhMclwour (1936) 12
NEW STATESmAi & NATiON 845, 846, and, e.g., the Liverpool police act involved in
Wise v. Dunning, [1902] 1 K. B. 167.
33. "Besides actual breaches of the peace, anything that tends to provoke or excite
others to break it, is an offence . . ." 4 BL. Commr. *150; and see Lansbury v. Riley
[1914] 3 K. B. 229 (defendant was supporter of Women's Social & Political Union
whose object was to secure votes for women by having its members commit "crimes
against property. . . to coerce men . . . to put political pressure" on the government).
34. Wise v. Dunning [1902] 1 K. B. 167, 171, 176. Although the defendant was not
prosecuted under the Liverpool local act which enjoined the use of "insulting words"
etc., the court considered the act relevant in arriving at its decision.
35. Subsection 7 (2). Another change is the substitution of the words, "is likely to
be" for "may be." For another change, see page 420, infra.
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Although the facts in Wise v. Dunning may have justified a conviction, 0
the doctrine of the case is fraught with danger for civil liberties. For it is
obvious that many remarks may be highly "insulting" and yet worthy of
a public hearing; and if ideas of this sort are not to be suppressed, speech
for which scant justification can be found must be permitted. Nevertheless,
this section of the Act, like the old section, may readily be construed as
making unlawful the expression of any opinion, true or false, if it is "insult-
ing" and if it is likely to cause a breach of the peace.
Recent cases arising under this section of the Public Order Act may serve
as illustrations. Thus, a young Communist was sentenced to one month at
hard labor because he remarked that the Queen and Princess Elizabeth
"are what you pay for" and complained because the Government had initially
suppressed the facts concerning the former King and Mrs. Simpson.37 An-
other example is the case of a Fascist sentenced to two months at hard
labor who asserted that "England will never be England again" until all
Jews are expelled.38 Less flagrant, perhaps, is a case arising under the old
section, 39 where the court convicted persons distributing leaflets discussing
the evils of National Socialism to German visitors at an Anglo-German
football match. 40 Significant is the fact that in none of these cases had an
actual breach of the peace occurred.
The recent decision in the case of Duncan v. Jones41 provides the police
with even wider powers to disperse street meetings than those afforded by
Section Five of the Public Order Act. Just as the defendant in that case was
about to address a street gathering near the entrance of an unemployed
training centre, a policeman told her the meeting could not be held there,
but that she could speak at a point some 175 yards distant. A disturbance
had taken place in the training centre after the defendant had held such a
meeting at the same point a year previous. But when the defendant dis-
regarded the policeman's warning and commenced to speak at the proscribed
36. The syllabus summarizes the facts as follows: "The appellant, a Protestant
lecturer, had held meetings in public places in . ..Liverpool . .. In addressing those
meetings, he used gestures and language which were highly insulting . . . to Catholic
inhabitants .. . [This] conduct had ...caused breaches of the peace to be committed
by his opponents and supporters, and he threatened . . . to hold similar meetings . .
Religious feeling has always run high in Liverpool.
37. See The Times, May 20, 1937, p. 10, col. c.
38. See The Times, June 7, 1937, p. 11, col. b. But these words were those which
the defendant repeated in court. The report does not give the words spoken by the
accused at the scene of the arrest.
39. Cited supra note 32.
40. See Barrister, supra note 32, at 846. Also recounted in the article is the case
of a boy who was arrested under the old section for selling copies of The Daily Work-
er. There was no conviction, however. For accounts of other cases, see The Times,
Oct. 8, 1936, p. 11, col. a; id., Oct. 9, 1936, p. 16, col. d; id., Oct. 10, 1936, p. 7, col. b,
p. 9, col. b; id., Oct. 16, p. 11, col. b.
41. [1936] 1 K. B. 218, (1936) 52 L. Q. REV. 158, 470; (1937) 6 CAmn. L. J. 239.
(Vol. 47: 404
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location, she was arrested, and convicted in magistrate's court of the charge
of violating Acts of Parliament making it an offense "wilfully" to obstruct
any "peace officer when in the execution of his duty."4 2 Upon appeal to a
Divisional Court, her conviction was affirmed, the Court disposing of the
issue with disarming brevity. Lord Hewart, C. J., thought that the facts
indicated "dearly a causal connection" between the first meeting, "and the
disturbance which occurred after it." Humphries, J., in a fifteen line opinion,
stated: Having "reasonably apprehended a breach of the peace, . . . it
. . . became his [the police inspector's] duty to prevent anything which
in his view would cause that breach of the peace." 43
The decision expands the broad doctrine of Wise v. Duning in two ways.
First, it shifts the issue at trial from the objective fact, what would have been
the "consequence" of the projected conduct of the defendant, to the inquiry
-right or wrong, was the policeman reasonable in his opinion concerning
that consequence? It has been observed that as a result of this decision, the
police will no longer disperse street meetings by invoking the offenses of
assembling unlawfully or of using insulting words or behaviour. Instead,
they will simply order those participating in a meeting to disperse, and if
they refuse, arrest them for obstructing the police in the execution of their
duty.44 Second, this decision makes it possible to impose something akin to
a "previous restraint" upon speech.45 Unlike the offenses of unlawful assem-
bly, "insulting words or behaviour," and even of obstructing the streets in
many cases, which require as elements thereof at least the commencement
of speech or other overt acts on the part of the offenders, this new doctrine
may prevent a person from making any utterance whatsoever.40 Thus Duncan
v. Jones serves to make more impenetrable the legal barrier closing the
streets in England to those who wish to hold street meetings.47
It is no doubt a legitimate purpose to attempt to prevent a breach of
the peace, rather than to punish the offender after its occurrence. But the
operation of the law of street meetings in England suggests that the price
42. Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885, 48 & 49 Vict., c. 75, § 2, which
amends Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 112, § 12. For another recent
case arising under these acts, see Davies v. Griffiths [1937] 2 All Eng. 671 (K. B.
1937). Compare Despard v. Wilcox, 102 L. T. (m.s.) 103 (K. B. 1910) (suffragette
attempting to petition Prime Minister Asquith, convicted of obstructing police for failure
to move on) with People v. Malone, 156 App. Div. 10, 141 N. Y. Supp. 149 (2d Dep't
1913) (suffragette persistently questioning Governor Woodrow Wilson at Presidential
campaign meeting, convicted of disturbing a public assemblage). See also Panhhurst
v. Jarvis, 101 L. T. (N.s.) 946 (K. B. 1909) (suffragette convicted of obstructing the
police).
43. Duncan v. Jones [19361 1 K. B. 218, 223.
44. See Jennings, .n pra note 16, at 20.
45. See 4 BL- Comms. * 151-2; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 713 e! seq.
46. Where permits are required for street meetings, similar results may also be
reached by a refusal to grant a permit.
47. See Wade, Police Powers & Public Meelings (1937) 6 CA.n. L J. 175, 179.
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to be paid for the accomplishment of this end may come too high, for it is
clear that these attempts to preserve public order have resulted in entrusting
the police with very broad discretion to arrest. And at the trial discussion
is centered around "natural consequence" and "cause" and the "reasonable
apprehensions" of a policeman; obviously, what the judge will think consti-
tutes, for example, a "natural consequence" of a speech will in part be con-
ditioned upon his political beliefs. Indeed, in many cases judges exercise
virtually complete control, for defendants charged with the offense of using
"insulting words or behaviour" or "obstructing the police" are not afforded
a jury trial. Instead, they are brought before a magistrate sitting without a
jury.48 Such magistrates, it is charged, usually exhibit a decided propensity
to agree with the police,49 become impatient with defendants who do not
plead guilty,50 and with the unskilled manner in which those defendants
who cannot afford counsel conduct their own defense. 1
United States. Americans may point with pride to the fact that our Con-
stitution knows "of such a thing as . . . [a] specific right of public meet-
ing." 52 For the Constitution guarantees against Congressional aggression
"the right of the people peaceably to assemble." 3 And state constitutions
impose similar prohibitions upon state legislatures 4 Unfortunately, however,
these constitutional provisions do not guarantee a place for the people peace-
ably to assemble, and restrictions on street meetings in this country are
consequently as extensive as in England.
48. See § 7(2) of the Public Order Act. For a general discussion of summary pro-
cedure, see KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (15th ed. rev. by Phillips, 1937) 508-.
522. There has been considerable criticism of summary jurisdiction in England. See
HOWARD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND (1931) 319-329.
49. See Solicitor, "Police" Courts (1937) 14 NEW STATESMAN & NATION 244. It is
also said that policemen when serving as witnesses are awed by the presence of their
superior officers who conduct the prosecution, and are apt too readily to agree with the
prosecution's theory of the case. See Police Advocacy (1937) 101 J. P. Rm. 714. The
writer calls for the removal of the popular "impression that 'police' courts are the courts
of the police." And see The Times, Oct. 6, 1936, p. 4, col. f, where a magistrate is
reported as having said at a hearing arising out of Fascist disturbances: "I am entirely
behind the police in any remedy they may ask for."
50. See The "Police" Court (1937) 101 J. P. REV. 680; and cf. Solicitor, Farce
of Legal Aid (1937) 14 NEW STATESMAN & NATION 828, 829.
51. Magistrates' Practice & Procedure (1937) 101 J. P. REv. 548. And even if the
accused is not convicted, his arrest will have effectively prevented the exercise of 1119
right of free speech.
52. See DIcEY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 267.
53. U. S. CoNsT. AMENDT. I.
54. These constitutional prohibitions are reprinted in Jarrett & Mund, siupra note
22, 36-38. The Supreme Court has held that the word "liberty" as used in U. S.
Const. Amendt. XIV, includes the right of assembly. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353, 364 (1937), (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 862. See also United States v. Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542, 552 (1875).
[Vol. 47: 404412
19381 PUBLIC ORDER AND RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY 413
Perhaps the most frequently employed devices in the United States for
preventing or dispersing street meetings are municipal ordinances. These
fall into two well-defined classes: ordinances prohibiting obstruction in the
streets, and ordinances prohibiting meetings in public places without a permit
from some authorized municipal authority. The first class is almost invari-
ably upheld both against constitutional objections,55 and against attacks based
on the ground that the ordinances are unreasonable and therefore ultra vires.m
They are sustained by a doctrine similar to that invoked in England: "Streets
. . . are for the use of all the public to pass and repass thereon."s7 Occa-
sionally a dissenting judge is heard to protest against the inadequacy of
the evidence and to urge that the obstruction is only technical and that there
was no substantial hindrance to traffic - but in vain.53
The second type of ordinance, that requiring permits for street meetings,
has generally been upheld against attacks founded on various constitutional
provisions, as well as the ultra vircs contention5 9 The courts have usually
55. Wilson v. Eureka City, 173 U. S. 32 (1899); Ex parte Garrison, 18 Cal. App.
(2d) 495, 64 P. (2d) 1007 (1937) (ordinance requiring crowd to disperse upon com-
mand of policeman "whenever the free passage of any street or sidewalk shall be
obstructed, except on occasion of public meeting" held constitutional) ; Tacoma v. Roe,
68 P. (2d) 1028 (Wash. 1937).
56. Chariton v. Simmons, 87 Iowa 226, 54 N. IV. 146 (1893) ; State v. Sugerman,
126 Minn. 477, 148 N. NV. 466 (1914); People v. Pierce, 85 App. Div. 125, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 79 (3d Dep't 1903) (political speaker).
57. People v. Wallace, 85 App. Div. 170, 173, 83 N. Y. Supp. 130, 132 (meeting
of Socialist Labor Party). See pp. 406-7, supra.
58. See Parker, P. J., dissenting in People v. Pierce, 85 App. Div. 125, 129-30,
83 N. Y. Supp. 79, 82-3 (3d Dep't 1903). The leading case in Massachusetts on this
question is typical of both the traditionally reactionary and highly conceptual approach
of the judiciary of that state to questions involving civil liberties. (See also notes 61
and 157 infra). Although the City of Lynn had granted the defendant a permit to
hold a meeting, defendant's conviction of the common law offense of obstructing a high-
way was affirmed. The court held that a city had no power to grant a permit for a
meeting on the highway even though the meeting did not occasion inconvenience or
delay to the public. Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480 (1929).
59. Cases upholding the ordinances: Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 39
N. E. 113 (1895) (gospel preacher) ; Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905)
(Socialist speaker); Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 Ill. App. 60 (1890) (ordinance
sustained but held inapplicable since Salvation Army street meeting was not a "public
meeting"); Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 87 N. NV. 785 (1901) (gospel preacher);
Burldtt v. Beggans, 103 N. J. Eq. 7, 142 AUt. 181 (1928) (injunction against police
interference with street meetings denied); People cx rel Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y.
96, 133 N. E. 364 (1921) (Socialist) ; Duquesne City v. Fincke, 269 Pa. 112, 112 Ati.
130 (1920) (meeting to discuss the cause of organized labor); People v. Smith, 263
N. Y. 255, 188 N. E. 745 (1934) (ordinance requiring permit to expound atheism on
public streets held constitutional). [Vith this last case, compare People v. Smith, 259
N. Y. 48, 180 N. E. 891 (1932) (ordinance requiring permit for holding religious
meetings on streets held inapplicable to atheist speaker since atheism is not a religion).]
Contra: State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 113 At. 385 (1921) (ordinance held uncon-
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
cursorily dismissed arguments based on guaranties of free speech and the
right of assembly, on the ground that the legislature has as much right "to
forbid public speaking in a highway" as has "the owner of a private house
to forbid it in his house." 60 Claims that the ordinance prescribes no standard
for the guidance of the licensing authority have likewise usually been unsuc-
cessful.6 ' And of no avail was, the invocation of the equal protection clause
against one ordinance which applied only to meetings "for political pur-
poses." 
62
This type of ordinance has the disadvantage of giving the police an oppor-
tunity for discriminating against political minorities - discriminations it
seems almost impossible to prove satisfactorily in court. Therefore, the
frequent and pious assurances of the judges that relief will be granted if
and when discrimination can be shown,63 seem a doubtful safeguard.
Unlawful assembly is another charge employed throughout the United
States against participants in street meetings. There has been a marked
increase in recent years of the relatively few cases which formerly reached
appellate courts.0 4 Thus, the course of popularity of this offense in the
United States would appear precisely opposite to that in England. Riot, an
offense which involves all the elements of unlawful assembly plus an actual
stitutional because granted absolute and uncontrolled discretion to chief of police);
Anderson v. Tedford, 80 Fla. 376, 85 So. 673 (1920) (ordinance held unreasonable in
absence of specific charter provision).
60. Holmes, C. J., in Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511, 39 N. E. 113
(1895) aff'd, 167 U. S. 43 (1897). This opinion is frequently cited.
Very recently one such ordinance was used to prohibit the C.I.O. from holding an
open-air meeting, apparently on the ground that the meeting would "lead to" violent
opposition from certain veterans' organizations. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1937, p. 7,
col. 5. But cf. Field, J. in Beatty v. Gillbanks, 9 Q. B. D. 308, 314, (1882), quoted
note 30 supra.
61. Cases sustaining ordinances against this attack: People ex. rel. Doyle v. Atwell,
Burkitt v. Beggans. Contra: State v. Coleman, all cited supra note 59. Here again the
courts have drawn upon Holmes' argument-or rather, assertion-in Commonwealth v.
Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 512, 39 N.E. 113 (1895), that a prohibition against the use of
the streets "is not made invalid by the fact that it may be removed in a particular
case by a license from a city officer."
62. Fitts v. Atlanta, 121 Ga. 567, 49 S. E. 793 (1905) (Socialist).
63. See, e.g., Cardozo, J., concurring in People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N. Y.
96, 103, 133 N. E. 364, 367 (1921); but see State v. Coleman, 96 Conn. 190, 196-7,
113 Atl. 385, 387 (1921). Compare Stephen, J., in Reg. ex rel. Gay v. Powell, 51
L. T. (N.s.) 92 (Q. B. 1884), at 94: " . . . if I thought that, merely because these
people did not like the Salvation Army and their meetings, they tried to strain that
bye-law to prevent their doing what they prima facie have a right to do, my view of the
case would be altogether different."
64. See Riot & Incitement to Riot (1935) 3 I. J. A. Buu.. (No. 12) 1, 10-12;
N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1937, p. 14, cols. 4, 5 (six C. I. 0. members arrested for unlawful
assembly in Jersey City).
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breach of the peace, 65 has also recently gained in popularity in the United
States.6
Since common law crimes have been abolished in most states, the precise
definition of the offense of unlawful assembly is generally a matter of statu-
tory interpretation. The statutes vary considerably among the states, and
the different stages of the development of unlawful assembly in England
find counterparts in the United States. Thus Missouri's statute, seemingly
embodying the original definition of unlawful assembly, defines the offense
as an assemblage with intent to commit an "unlawful act" either "with force
or violence . . .against the peace," or in trrorcm populi0 7 In New Jersey,
common -law crimes are perpetuated by statute.0 When the now leading
Butterworth case arose some ten years ago, the court looked to "the" common
law for its guide.6 9 But even though the court relied on the definitions of
Hawkins and of the Graham case,70 it held that a meeting of strikers in a
public square to protest against the refusal of the police to permit them
to hold a street meeting did not constitute an unlawful assembly because
there was no proof that the meeting inspired "in the minds of firm and cour-
ageous persons a well-founded fear of threatening danger to the public
peace;" 1 this, despite the testimony of one policeman "that the crowd put
him in fear." 72 This acceptance of the Hawkins definition is the prevailing
rule in this country.
65. See note 25, supra. The Pennsylvania courts seem to have confused the offense
of unlawful assembly with that of riot. See Commonwealth v. Kahn, 116 Pa. Super.
28, 176 At. 242 (1935) (meeting in front of German consulate to protest Thaelmann
imprisonment); c. Koss v. State, 217 WiVs. 325, 258 N. V. 860 (1935) (assembly to
protest against reception to German ambassador, convictions for unlawful assembly
affirmed).
66. See Riot & Incitement to Riot (1935) 3 .J. A. BuLa. (No. 12) 1, 10-12. The
American riot cases involving economic and political disputes are collected in id. at 1,
n. 6, 10, n. 7-13. On riot in England, see Field v. Receiver of Met. Police [1907]
2 K. B. 853; KENNY, op. cit. sipra note 48, at 331-334. The penalty for statutory riot is
more severe than for those offenses previously discussed.
67. Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) § 4221, In re Coder, 226 Mo. App. 479, 44
S. NV. (2d) 179 (1931) (conviction of defendant who had advocated adherence to the
Communist party reversed on grounds of no common interest and no intent to commit
unlawful act).
68. N. J. Comp. STAT. (1911) tit. 52, §215, providing that unlawful assembly and
"all other offenses of an indictable nature at common law and not provided for" by
statute "shall be misdemeanors," has been held to leave intact the common law definition
of unlawful assembly. State v. Butterworth, 104 N. J. L. 579, 581, 142 Atl. 57, 58
(1928), revzg 104 N. J. L. 43, 139 At. 161 (1927).
69. Ibid., 142 Atl. at 59.
70. Id., at 583, 142 Atl. at 59. And see pp. 408-409, supra.
71. State v. Butterworth, 104 N. J. L.. 579, 588, 142 AtI. 57, 61 (1928); but see
Koss v. State, 217 Wis. 325, 258 N. NV. 860 (1935) (members of assembly to protest
against reception to German ambassador convicted of unlawful assembly under statute
[Wis. STAT. (1935) § 347.02] embodying the Hawkins definition).
72. State v. Butterworth, 104 N. J. L. 579. 587, 142 At. 57, 60 (1928).
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On the other hand, the New York statute concerning unlawful assemblies
goes even further than current English doctrine. In New York, three or
more assembled persons who "threaten any act" simply "tending towards
a breach of the peace," are guilty of the offense. 73 And in the famous case
of People v. Most, which involved a meeting of sympathizers with those
convicted following the Haymarket riots, the court upheld the conviction of
the defendants though there was no evidence that the meeting had caused
fear to reasonably courageous men.74 Because of the breadth of the statute,
the Court was able to hold that the threats necessary to the commission of
the crime may relate "to acts . . . to be performed at some future time,
when affairs" shall be "ripe" for their performance. 7 This statement - a
repudiation of the clear and present danger doctrine which would seem to
inhere in the Hawkins definition76 appears to afford a convenient weapon
for the conviction of vague but vehement "revolutionaries."
The offenses classified generally as breach of the peace and disorderly
conduct 77 - the term employed in the United States -are likewise fre-
quently employed as weapons against political minorities and labor unions
in industrial disputes.78 These offenses differ from unlawful assembly chiefly
in the fact that unlawful assembly requires the concurrence of at least three
persons in the prohibited conduct. Anciently, breach of the peace had con-
sisted of "any injurious Force or Violence moved against the Person of
73. . Y. PENAL. LAW §2092: "Whenever three or more persons: 1. Assemble
with intent to commit any unlawful act by force; or 2. Assemble with intent to carry
out any purpose in such a manner as to disturb the public peace; or 3. Being assembled
attempt or threaten any act tending towards a breach of the peace, or an injury to
person or property, or any unlawful act, such assembly is unlawful, and every person
participating therein, by his presence, aid, or instigation, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
But this section shall not be construed as to prevent the peaceable assembling of persons
for lawful purposes of protest [sic!] or petition."
74. People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108, 27 N. E. 970 (1891).
75. People v. Most, 128 N. Y. 108, 115, 27 N. E. 970, 972 (1891). But see People
v. Blair, 94 N. Y. L. J., Sept. 11, 1935, p. 717, cols. 3-5 (charge of unlawful assembly
against persons who tore- down swastika flag from German liner, Bremen, dismissed).
The court considered N. Y. Penal Law § 2092 (prohibiting unlawful assemblies) "merely
declaratory of the common law."
76. See p. 408, supra. For other recent cases involving unlawful assembly, see
Notes (1929) 58 A. L. R. 751; (1934) 93 A. L. R. 737. The California cases are
discussed in Comment (1935) 23 CALIF. L. Rv. 180.
77. For statutes, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6194; ILL. Ray. STAT. (Smith-
Hurd, 1935) c. 38, § 160; N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 722; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit.
18, § 421. For ordinances, see, e.g., those discussed in the following cases: Ponchatoula
v. Bates, 173 La. 824, 138 So. 851 (1931); Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S. W. 316 (Mo.
App. 1927) (Negro preacher shouting "Amen," "Praise God," "Glory Hallelujah," heard
six blocks distant held not guilty); Cleveland Hts. v. Christie, 128 Ohio St. 297, 190
N. E. 770 (1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 574 (1934); Lerch v. Sandusky, 23 Ohio
App. 109 (1926).
78. See Note (1927) 48 A. L. R. 83.
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another, his Goods, Lands, or other Possessions, whether it be by threaten-
ing words, or by furious gesture, or force of the body, or any other force
used in terrorem." 79 Modem statutes and ordinances in the United States,
however, have expanded this definition along two lines; first, by prohibiting
not only conduct that reasonably would be expected to result in physical
violence, but also conduct which, by the stretch of a policeman's imagination,
might possibly result in disorder if allowed to continue;8O and, secondly, by
couching the restrictions in language so broad as to permit of a construction
interdicting almost any provocative words uttered in public on public ques-
tions.8
1
Portions of the New York Penal Code section on disorderly conducte
now increasingly invoked, are similar to Section Five of the Public Order
Act. Relevant subsections provide that:
"any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby
a breach of the peace may be occasioned . . . 1. Uses offensive, disorderly,
threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior; 2. Acts
in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be of-
fensive to others; 3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses
to move on when ordered by the police; 4. By his actions causes a crowd
to collect, except when lawfully addressing such a crowd ;" "shall be deemed
to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct".
As in England, offenders are tried by a magistrate sitting without a jury.P
While these clauses have been used most significantly by the police in
the arbitrary regulation or prohibition of picketing,84 they have also been
employed to curb political minorities. In cases arising under these provi-
sions the New York courts do not insist upon a finding by the trial court that
79. DALrox, TaE Coura JusTicE (1715) 9.
80. Compare the similar development in England (see pp. 408-11, mspra).
81. "A disturbance of the peace may be created by any act or conduct of a person
. . . which throws into confusion things settled, or which causes excitement unrest,
disquietude, or fear among persons of ordinary, normal temperament." Ponchatoula v.
Bates, 173 La. 824, 828, 138 So. 851, 852 (1931).
It would be difficult to conceive of any speech on a public question which would
not fall within this definition. Compare Remarks of Mr. Kingsley Griffith, L. P.:
"You are not entitled to legislate against an expression of opinion just because it is
provocative . . . Liberty only arises when people are saying something which is very
provocative." Reported in 318 H. C. Dn. (5th ser. 1936) 1411. And see Holmes, J.,
dissenting in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 673 (1925).
8Z N. Y. PENAL LAw, § 722.
83. See People v. Sadowsky, 149 Misc. 583, 267 N. Y. Supp. 762 (Spec. Sess.,
1933).
Section 723 fixes the punishment at "imprisonment . . . for . . . six months, or by
a fine not exceeding fifty dollars, or by both:' or "by placing on probation for a term
not to exceed two years." Compare §.7(2) of the Public Order Act. See p. 409, supra.
84. See Picketing as Disorderly Conduct in New York (1935) 4 L J. A. Bum.
(No. 6) 1, 11, 12.
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the defendant's conduct might have occasioned a breach of the peace.8 5 Con-
cededly, such a finding would be a mere formality, since the Court of Appeals
has in effect adopted the doctrine of Duncan v. Jonas by holding that the
arresting officer's judgment as to the likelihood of such a breach must be
accepted unless "purely arbitrary and . . . not calculated in any way to
promote-the public order."
' 80
Although there is apparently no exact counterpart in this country to the
English legislation prohibiting the wilful obstruction of a policeman in the
execution of his duty, somewhat similar statutes and ordinances are to be
found.87 Noteworthy is Subsection Three of the New York statute quoted
above, which penalizes a refusal to move on when requested by the police.
One dissimilarity, however, is the fact that the New York statute requires
as a condition precedent to conviction a finding by the court that the refusal
to move on might have occasioned a breach of the peace. Nevertheless, the
New York statute may have a more sweeping effect than the doctrine of
Duncan v. Jones, for it has been held that "failure . . . to obey directions
of. a police officer, not exceeding his authority, may [of itself] . . . lead
to a breach of the peace." 88
Here again, we find a recurring judicial justification for such legislation;
namely, that "it is . . .most salutary that the police . . . should have
reasonable . . . discretion" in this matter.
80
"PUBLIC MEETINGS" HELD ON "PRIVATE PREMISES"0 °
England. Because the police have so frequently suppressed or interfered
with street meetings held under the auspices of political minorities, it would
85. The courts have tended, however, to insist upon such a finding in some cases
arising under §722(2), but not in situations where civil liberties were involved. See
People v. Perry, 265 N. Y. 362, 193 N. E. 175 (1934) ; People v. Schroedel, 147 Misc.
296, 263 N.Y. Supp. 658 (Spec. Sess. 1933): (" § 722(2) . . . is upon its face . . .
so broad . . . that Appellate Courts should limit its application.").
86. People v. Galpern, 259 N. Y. 279, 285, 181 N. E. 572, 574 (1932) (conviction
under § 722(3) affirmed of person conversing with friends on sidewalk who refused
to obey command of policeman to move on though he used no threatening or abusive
language). But cf. People v. Steinberg, 142 Misc. 602, 254 N. Y. Supp. 488 (Spec.
Sess., 1931).
87. See N. Y. PzNr.AL LAw, §722(3), and ordinances discussed in the following
cases: Ex parte Garrison, 18 Cal. App. (2d) 495, 64 P. (2d) 1007 (1937); State v.
Sugerman, 126 Minn. 477, 148 N. W. 466 (1914); Benson v. Norfolk, 163 Va. 1037,
177 S. E. 222 (1934). Cf. State v. Jasmin, 105 Vt. 531, 168 Atl. 545 (1933).
88. People v. Galpern, 259 N. Y. 279, 282, 181 N. E. 572 (1932), cited supra note 86,
89. Benson v. Norfolk, 163 Va. 1037, 1040, 177 S. E. 222, 224 (1934). Compare
Mathew, dissenting in Kruse v. Johnson [1898] 2 Q. B. 83 (cited supra note 21)
at 109: " . . . it was said that confidence might be reposed in the discretion of a
policeman, and that he would not be likely to interfere unreasonably. This seems to
me too generous a view of the qualifications of the ordinary constable."
90. Section 9(1) of the Public Order Act defines "meeting" as any "meeting
held for the purpose of the discussion of matters of public interest or for the purpose
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seem politic for these groups to heed the derisive advice of the police, "Hire
a Hall." This suggestion, however, assumes financial capacity to rent a hall
and general availability of meeting halls to unpopular organizations. Both
assumptions are frequently not demonstrable.
While for many purposes it is doubtless preferable to hold a street meeting,
there would seem to be distinct advantages to holding meetings indoors. Not
only is the audience apt to be more attentive and quiet, but also, because
indoor meetings- unlike street meetings - are prima facie lawful in Eng-
land, sanctions exist for controlling members of the audience hostile to the
sponsors. Thus, the Public Meeting Act of 1908 11 made it an offense for
any person at a lawful public meeting to act, or to incite others to act, in
a disorderly manner for the purpose of preventing the transaction of the
business for which the meeting was called.92 But the Act became a dead
letter, apparently because it did not grant the police power to arrest offenders
without a warrant.93 Section Six of the Public Order Act was passed to
remedy this defect. It amends the Public Meeting Act by providing that
"if any constable reasonably suspects any person of committing any offence"
under that Act, "he may if requested to do so by the Chairman of the
meeting, require that person to declare to him immediately his name and
address . . . " If the person requested refuses, he is guilty of an offense
and the constable may arrest him without a warrant.0 4
Though the act places greater sanctions in the hands of the sponsors of
indoor meetings, it authorizes police action only at the request of the chair-
of the expression of views on such matters." It defines "private premises" as any
'tpremises to which the public have access (whether on payment or otherwise) only
by permission of the owner, occupier, or lessee of the premises." It defines "public
meeting" as "any meeting in a public place and any meeting which the public or any
section thereof are permitted to attend, whether on payment or otherwise."
Compare Berglund v. Graham [1937] Vict. L R. 162, at 164, (1937) 11 AusTRAuizw
L J. 100 (" . . . a public meeting does not mean the same thing as a meeting held
in public.") See also Bloomington v. Richardson, 38 Ill. App. 60 (1890).
91. 8 Edw. 7, c. 66. See note 18, supra.
92. Prior Ito the passage of the Public Meeting Act, 1908, disturbance of a public
assemblage apparently was not an offense unless it constituted a breach of the eace.
See Wooding v. Oxley, 9 C. & P. 1 (N. P. 1839) (disturbance at meeting of tem-
perance society). This is not a necessary element of the offense under § 1 of the Public
Meeting Act.
Wilfully disturbing a lawful relious assemblage was made a misdemeanor by 52
Geo. 3, c. 155, § 12 (1812).
93. "There is nothing in the Act which enables anybody in any circumstances to
be arrested. There is nothing in it to enable anybody to insist upon a man giving his
name and address.' Remarks of Sir John Simon, reported in 317 IL C. Dma. (5th ser.
1936) 1364.
94. Section 2(6) of the Act [see note 115 infra] provides: "Nothing in this section
shall be construed as prohibiting the employment of a reasonable number of persons
as stewards to assist in the preservation of order at any public meeting held upon
private premises . . . "
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man of a meeting, and it is not concerned with a situation where the sponsors
do not desire police aid or even police presence. But a recent decision of
the King's Bench Division subjects this type of meeting to severe restrictions.
It had long been thought that the police could not enter public meetings held
on private premises against the will of the promoters unless they had reason
to believe that a breach of the peace was being committed. 95 But in 1935 in
the case of Thomas v. Sawkins, this exception was extended to all cases
where the police have reasonable grounds for believing that a breach of the
peace will be committed. 96 The case involved police presence at a Coni-
munist meeting held in a hired hall to protest against the Incitement to
Disaffection Bill.97 In defense to an action for technical assault, the police
justified their conduct on the ground that they "anticipated that the meeting
would become an unlawful assembly or a riot or that breaches of the peace
would take place, and that seditious speeches were likely to be made."9 8 Fol-
lowing another brief opinion by Lord Hewart, C. J., Amory, J., employing
a non-sequitur, argued: If "a constable hears an affray in a house he may
break in to suppress it . . . If he can do that, . . . he has a right to break
in to prevent an affray which he has reasonable cause to suspect may take
place on private premises." 99
By authorizing the police to enter meetings held on private premises when
they have a reasonable suspicion that a breach of the peace "may" occur,
this decision may be said to bring the repressive doctrine of Duncan v. Jones
indoors. The law of that case may now be employed increasingly to restrict
indoor meetings in advance of unlawful conduct on the part of those par-
ticipating in the meeting. And since Section Five of the Public Order Act
makes it possible to commit the old offense of using "insulting words" at a
public meeting even when held on private premises, 00 the decision in Thomas
v. Sawkins010 can also be said to have brought that offense indoors; or at
least to have assisted in the process.
95. See Report of Dep'tal Comm. on Duties of Police with Regard to Prescrvation
of Order at Public Meetings (Cmd. 4673, 1909); Police & Public Meetings on Private
Premises (1935) 79 SoL J. 445, 446; Remarks of Sir John Simon, reported in 318
H. C. DFB. (5th ser. 1936) 679; Goodhart, Thomas v. Sawkins: A Constitutional Inno.
vation (1936) 6 CAMB. L. J. 22.
96. [1935] 2 K. B. 249, (1935) 49 HARv. L. Rsv. 156 (approving the decision),
(1936) 4 I. J. A. BULL. (No. 8) 6, (1936) 6 CAmB. L. J. 96. See also Davies v.
Griffiths [1937] 2 All. Eng. 671 (K. B. 1937) (defendants convicted of obstructing
police officer seeking to enter meeting where it was thought appeal would be made
for volunteers to war in Spain). For the case in the lower court, see (1937) 101 3. P.
REV. 171.
97. The bill later was enacted into law as the Incitement to Disaffection Act,
1934, 24 & 25 Geo. 5, c. 56.
98. Thomas v. Sawkins, [1935] 2 K. B. 249, 254, 256.
99. Id., at 255-6.
100. For definition, see note 90, supra.
101. Although no appeal lies from a decision of the Divisional Court in criminal cases
[Judicature Act § 31(1), 15 & 16 Geo. 5 (1925) c. 49], the doctrine of Thomas v. Saw-
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United States. The greatest obstacle facing minority groups in holding
indoor meetings in the United States is the difficulty of securing a meeting-
hall. Municipal authorities employ numerous techniques to thwart indoor
meetings of this sort. Most direct and blunt is Mayor Hague's ordinance
which, in effect, forbids the owner of a meeting hall to rent it for Communist
meetings unless police permission is first securedj °2  It is exceptional to
require permits for meetings held in private halls ;103 a more common tech-
nique stems from laws requiring licenses for theaters and public halls.2"
These are presumably operative to safeguard buildings against fire and simi-
lar hazards. Nevertheless owners who do not cooperate with the police by
refusing to rent their halls to objectionable radicals sometimes find their
licenses revoked because of the "structural . ..condition" of the building1 05
A final source of discrimination arises in connection with the administration
of statutes authorizing municipalities to issue permits for the use of school
buildings to permit "discussion of matters of . . . public interest."100 A
recent survey has disclosed frequent and confessed discriminations against
political minorities seeking such permits.10 7
kins (a criminal prosecution) may nevertheless be overruled. Thus the decision in Rex
v. Denyer [1926] 2 K. B. 258 (Ct. Cr. App.), a criminal prosecution, did not preclude
a different result in the civil action of Hardie & Lane v. Chilton [1928] 2 K. B. 306
(C. A.). The conflict that raged, in the books at least, [see 20 Cr. App. R. 185, 186
(1928)] was finally put to rest when the rule of the Hardie case was adopted by the
House of Lords. Thorne v. Motor Trade Ass'n (1937] A. C. 797 (H. L.). The possi-
bility thus remains of overturning Thomas v. Sawkin.s by the institution of a civil
action for assault.
102. The ordinance is discussed in (1937) 5 I. J. A. BuLL. 84. In Hudson County
Cont. of Communist Party v. Hague, the plaintiffs secured an injunction against the
police "from utilizing the ordinance so as to prevent owners from renting halls for the
holding of Communist meetings." Ibid. Nevertheless, the C.I.O. very recently charged
that it has "been unable to hire a meeting hall in Mayor Hague's stronghold because
of intimidation of the owners by city officials." See N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1937, p. 7,
col. 5.
103. See Jarrett & fund, supra note 22, at 29.
104. See, e.g., MAsS. GEr. LAws (1932) c. 143, § 34, cited (1935) 49 HAR7. L. REV.
156, at 157.
105. See Jarrett & fund, supra note 22, at 29.
106. CAL. SCHOOL CODE (Deering, 1932) § 6.740. Some statutes authorize the school
board in its discretion to require the group applying for the use of the building to "pay
the actual expense incurred for janitor service, light, and heat." See Micir. Coin'.
LAws (1929) §7431. Such a provision would seem to invite discrimination against
unpopular minorities.
107. SCHOOL BUILDINGS AS PUBuC FORUMS (Am. Civ. Lib. Union Pamph., 1934);
see Comment (1935) 23 CALIF. L. REv. 180, 192; and see case reported in (1935) 4
I. J. A. BuLL. (No. 2) 1 (application for mandamus by Youth Congress to compel
Detroit Bd. of Educ. to issue permit for use of school, granted) ; cf. Coughlin v. Chi-
cago Park Dist., 364 Ii. 90, 4 N. E. (2d) 1 (1936) (application for vrit of mandamus
to compel park commissioners to grant Nat. Union for Social Justice permit to use
Soldiers Field, denied).
That the remedy of mandamus may frequently be ineffectual, see Barron v. Belonay,
229 Mich. 201, 200 N. W. 944 (1924). There certiorari to review the action of the lower
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But once a group is successful in securing a hall there appears to be little
difficulty in maintaining order at the meeting. Contrary to the situation in
England, disturbances caused by persons antagonistic to the sponsors of
such meetings (other than the police) do not appear to be widespread, and
the offense of disturbing a public assemblage, which is a statutory crime in
some American jurisdictions, 10 8 apparently has been rarely invoked in modern
times against disturbers of political assemblages.1 9
In localities where permits are not required for meetings held in private
halls," 0 it seems clear that the police have no right to be present at a meeting
held on private premises unless there is reasonable ground for belief that
a breach of the peace is being committed."' Nevertheless, the police on
occasions do enter such meetings without any authority."' Although there
is some indication that an injunction can be secured against such conduct, 118
the remedy, even if granted, would usually come too late.
court in issuing mandamus compelling school board to grant permit was denied, as
presenting a moot question, because the date for which the application was made had
passed. Sharpe, J., dissenting (two judges concurring) said: ". . . it would be diffi-
cult . . . to secure a construction of the statute in a proceeding when the time for
which the application had been made had not expired. Id. at 20, 200 N. W. at 945.
108. See, e.g., WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2547; see also Ky.
STAT. ANN. (Carroll, 1936) § 1267a (making it an offense to throw "eggs or missiles
of any kind" at the speaker) ; N. Y. PENAL CODE, § 1470.
109. The large majority of the appellate cases concerning this offense arise out of
the disturbance of religious assemblages, particularly in the South. Cf. Note (1921)
12 A. L. R. 650.
See Commonwealth v. Porter, 1 Gray 476 (Mass. 1854) (defendant convicted of dis-
turbing temperance meeting-leading case); People v. Malone, 156 App. Div. 10, 141
N. Y. Supp. 149 (2d Dep't. 1913) cited supra note 42; Literell v. Commonwealth, 266
Ky. 235, 98 S. IV. (2d) 909 (1936) (defendant's conviction of charge of disturbing a
veterans' association meeting, reversed) ; (1934) 3 I. J. A. BULL. (No. 6) 3 (demon-
strators at Harvard commencement protesting against presence of Ernst Hanfstaongel
convicted of disturbing a public assemblage).
110. See note 103, supra.
111. See, Right of Police to Attend Public Meetings (1936) 4 I. J. A. BuLL. (No. 8)
6, 8. For a case contra to Thomas v. Sawkins [1935] 1 K. B. 249 (discussed supra page
420, see Gallagher v. Porter, Case No. 305052 (Los Ang. Mun. Ct. 1933), reported in
(1933) 2 I. 3. A. BuLL. (No. 3) 2. There the court refused to admit evidence as to the
doctrines of the Communist Party which were offered to show that the meeting would
have resulted in violations of such laws as the Criminal Syndicalism Act.
112. See Commonwealth v. Cooper, 95 Pa. Super. 382, 384 (1929) (defendant con-
victed of disorderly conduct for actions in protesting against unlawful police conduct);
Commonwealth v. Gabrow, 97 Pa. Super. 459 (1929) ("protest against unwarranted
• ..actions of policemen cannot justify . . , disorderly conduct" Id. at 463).
113. Cf. Louisville v. Lougher, 209 Ky. 299, 272 S. W. 748 (1925) (interferencc by
city police with proposed unobjectionable speech on "Americanism" enjoined as inter-
ference with property right of speaker who was to be paid for his efforts) ; cf. Btiris
v. McAdoo, 113 App. Div. 165, 99 N. Y. Supp. 51 (1st Dep't 1906) ; Hagan v. McAdoo,
113 App. Div. 506, 99 N. Y. Supp. 255 (2d Dep't 1906).
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PRIVATE ARMIES
England. The Public Order Act imposes further restrictions on the con-
duct of persons engaging in public assembly. These restrictions do not
impinge directly upon free speech, but rather are designed to curb the cruder
forms of emotional appeal, largely indigenous to Fascists.
A uniform bolsters the ego of the wearer and stirs the emotions of the
bystander. Section One of the Public Order Act was passed to deprive Sir
Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts of this emotional advantage. It provides that:
"any person who in any public place or at any public meeting wears uniform
signifying his association with any political organisation or with the promo-
tion of any political object shall be guilty of an offence.' 114
Section Two (1) of the Act has for its purpose the abolition of associations,
whose members are
"organised or trained or equipped for the purpose of enabling them to be
employed in usurping the functions of the police or of the armed forces of
the Crown; or . . . for the purpose of enabling them to be employed for
the use or display of physical force in promoting any political object, or in
such manner as to arouse reasonable apprehension that they are organised
and either trained or equipped for that purpose . . . "15
Worthy of note perhaps as precedent for both of these sections of the
Act, is the unrepealed Unlawful Drilling Act of 1819,110 which outlaws un-
114. For definition of "public meeting", see note 90, supra. The section contains a
provision authorizing the chief of police with the consent of a Secretary of State, to
permit the wearing of such uniforms "on any ceremonial, anniversary, or other special
occasion" provided that he is satisfied that such a wearing "will not be likely to involve
risk of public disorder."
Subsection (2) requires the consent of the Attorney-General before further proceed-
ings may be taken against any person charged under subsection (1).
115. The Subsection contains a proviso that in a prosecution thereunder "it shall be
a defence .. . to prove that" the person charged did not consent to the organization,
etc., "of members . . . of the association." Subsection (2) provides that no prosecu-
tion under the section "shall be instituted . . .without the consent of the Attorney-
General;" (3) grants wide powers to the courts to dissolve the association and to dis-
pose of its property; (4) modifies common law rules of evidence at trials under the
section; (5) grants the High Court power to grant search warrants, etc., if "satisfied
. . .that there is reasonable ground for suspecting that an offense under this section
has been committed."
Subsection (6) is noted elsewhere. See note 94, supra. As to the effect of this pro-
vision, see 318 H. C. DE . (5th ser. 1936) 1689.
116. 60 Geo. 3 & 1 Geo. 4, c. 1. For prosecutions under this statute, see Gogarty v.
the Queen, 3 Cox C. C. 306 (Q. B. 1849) and Reg. v. Hunt, 3 Cox C. C. 215 (N. P.
1848).
See also the Statute of Northampton, 1328, (2 Edw. 3) still in effect, which pro-
hibits riding or going armed in public. For a prosecution under this statute, see Sir
John Knight's case, 3 Mod. 117 (K. B. 1636). In another report of the same case in
Comb. 38, the court says that the crime had almost fallen into desuetude. Yet Rex v.
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authorized assemblies, meeting "for the purpose of training" in "the use
of arms, or for . . . practising military exercise." 11 7 In addition the Un-
lawful Oaths Act of 1797,118 and Unlawful Societies Act of 1799,119 are
both still operative. 120 These acts were designed to outlaw every society, and
to punish the members, if an oath was required binding them
"to engage in any mutinous or seditious purpose, or to disturb the publick
peace, . . .or to obey the . . .commands of any . . .body of men not
lawfully constituted," or not to reveal "or give evidence against any . . .
person, or . . . any unlawful combination or confederacy.
'121
Significant is the fact that these statutes were later employed for a time in
suppressing labor organizations.
122
It will be observed that the term, "uniform," was left undefined in the
Public Order Act, presumably advertently, in order to give the courts
greater discretion in meeting new developments of political minorities in
the field of wearing apparel designed to avoid the provisions of Section One. 2 -3
Counsel has advised the Blackshirts "that while the wearing of the Blackshirt
uniform is illegal, the wearing of an ordinary shirt of black colour with tie
under an ordinary suit is legal."' 24 In the first six months of its operation
there were at least seven prosecutions under this section, mostly against Mos-
ley's men, but including an unsuccessful one against the Social Credit Party or
"Greenshirts."1
25
Meade, 19 T. L. R. 540 (N. P. 1903) reports a modern prosecution under the statute.
See also King v. Smith [1914] 2 Ir. R. 190.
Section 4 (1) of the Public Order Act, 1937, makes it an offense for "any person
ie. .while present at any public meeting or . . . procession" to have "with him any
offensive weapon, otherwise than in pursuance of lawful authority."
117. Section One.
118. 37 Geo. 3, c. 123.
119. 39 Geo. 3, c. 79.
120. See BAKER, Op. cit. supra note 7, at 110.
121. Unlawful Oaths Act, § 1.
122. See, e.g., Rex. v. Marks, 3 East 157 (K. B. 1802) (prosecution under Unlawful
Oaths Act of a labor association held to be a conspiracy to raise wages, though not to
engender mutiny or sedition). Rex. v. Lovelass, 6 C. & P. 596 (N. P. 1834), a prosecu-
tion under the Unlawful Oaths Act against the "General Society of Labourers." Efforts
to secure a remission of sentence were unavailing and the prisoners were sentenced to
seven years in New South Wales. Id. at 601.
In Luby v. Warwickshire Miners' Asso., [1912] 2 Ch. 371, although the court refused
to hold the acts obsolete since they had "received comparatively recent . . . applica-
tion," it nevertheless held trade unions impliedly exempt. Id., 379-81.
123. Mr. MacQuisten, M. P., considered § 1 "a complete inversion of one of the
fundamental principles of our criminal law" because it contained "no definition . . .
of 'uniform."' See 318 H. C. DEB. (5th Ser. 1936) 98.
124. See The Times, Jan. 2, 1937, p. 10, col. g.
125. See Remarks of the Solicitor-General, reported in 319 H. C. DEn. (5th ser.
1937) 1293. Unofficial reports of these and other cases can be found in (1937) 101
J. P. REv. 90; The Times, Jan. 28, 1937, p. 16, col. d; id., Jan. 30, 1937, p. 7, col. f;
id., June 3, 1937, p. 24, col. g.
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Despite the fact that Sections One and Two passed both Houses of Parlia-
ment with scarcely a dissenting voice, the desirability of this legislation is
debatable. Thus, it may be argued that since existing legislation and the
English common law crimes of assault, riot, unlawful assembly, and criminal
libel12 6 are more than adequate to curb violence, disorder, and abusive speech
on the part of the Blackshirts, these sections are unnecessary and may serve
as a dangerous tool in the hands of repressive majorities to come. The em-
ployment formerly of the Unlawful Societies Act as a weapon against labor
lends strength to this argument.
On the other hand, liberals of the traditional school would insist that these
sections do not violate their concept of the rights of free speech and assembly,
since no one is inhibited from peaceably assembling in civilian dress for the
purpose of voicing his views on public questions. Undaunted by predictions
as to the use to which the sections will be put at some future time, these liberals
may find cause for rejoicing in the reports that the Blackshirts in white shirts
have declined in number and popularity.l -r
United States. The rise of Nazi-Americans presents regulatory problems
not unlike those occasioned by the Blackshirts in England.1es Existing legis-
lation in many states seems adequate to curb the use of firearms by these
minorities on the right. Thus, many jurisdictions have statutes prohibiting
unauthorized bodies of men from associating "themselves together as a military
company with arms." 12 And a federal statute prohibits the transportation in
interstate commerce of unregistered firearms. 30 Both types of statutes have
126. Cf. KENNY, op. cit. supra note 48, 365-374.
A successful ciyil libel suit was recently brought against the Fascist magazine, Acnon.
"The decision did not affect financially Sir Oswald Mosley . . .but it was a stagger-
ing blow to the movement [i.e., B. U. F.], which has shrunken to a membership of a
few hundred." See N. Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1937, p. 1, col. 4, p. 2, cols. 4-5. Since it is
probable that the magazine is judgment proof, part or all of the exceptionally large
verdict (±20,000) must therefore be paid by the non-Fascist publisher. Cf. id. at p. 2,
col. 5. This suggests that "there is a real danger" in "the award of damages out of all
proportion to the actual proven injury" for "it may end in suppressing the publication
of all but the most respectable bourgeoise views." A London Diary (1937) 14 NEw
STATESMAN & NATION 634.
127. See supra note 126.
128. See p. 406, mspra.
129. WASa. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2546. See also, e.g., Iu. REv.
STAT. (1935) c. 129, §204; MASS. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 33, §60; ordinance of South-
bury, Conn., which prohibits "'military training or drilling with or without arms'
within the town limits except by legally constituted armed forces." See N. Y. Times,
Dec. 15, 1937, p. 26, col 2, and note 12, supra.
130. 48 STAT. 1239 (1934), 26 U. S. C A. § 1132j (1935). Attorney-General Cum-
mings has requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to determine whether Nazi
organizations have shipped unregistered firearms across state lines in contravention of
this statute. See N. Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1937, p. 40, col. 5.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47: 404
been sustained against charges that they violate constitutional guaranties of
the right of the people to bear arms,' 31 and a state statute against a contention
that it transcended the 14th Amendment.
132
But apparently the only statutes specifically prohibiting the wearing of uni-
forms are the federal law prohibiting unauthorized wearing of the official
uniforms of the armed forces of the United States, 33 and the state statutes
prohibiting unauthorized use of the uniforms of certain private lawful socie-
ties. 34 There is, however, some legislation not altogether dissimilar to that
of Section One of the Public Order Act. Thus, laws designed to curb the
activities of the Ku Klux Klan prohibit persons "disguised by having their
faces . . . concealed" from assembling in public places.' 35 Such statutes and
ordinances have withstood constitutional attack.'3 0 Although obviously not
identical with Section One of the Act, the favorable judicial climate of
opinion in which these laws were discussed, gives some hint as to the judicial
treatment that prospective anti-Nazi legislation will receive. 137
Most analogous, however, are the so-called red flag laws. 138 Their wording
varies considerably from state to state. In at least two jurisdictions, the
statutes are couched in language sufficiently broad to permit a construction
prohibiting the wearing of uniforms as well as display of flags for the purpose
of indicating "sympathy with or support of . . . forms of government, hostile
. . . or antagonistic to . . . [that] of the United States."1 3  More typical,
however, are the statutes which limit the prohibition specifically to the carry-
131. Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 44 N. E. 138 (1896) (upholding
Mass. statute cited note 129, supra) ; United States v. Adams, 11 F. Supp. 216 (S. D.
Fla., 1935) (upholding federal statute cited note 130 supra).
132. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886) (defendant was member of Lehr &
Wehr Verein, an organization for "improving the mental and bodily conditions of its
members" [Id., at 254]).
133. 39 STAT. 216 (1916), 10 U. S. C. A. § 1393 (1927) ; compare the Uniforms Act,
1894, 57 & 58 Vict., c. 45, § 2.
134. See e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) § 10-504.
135. N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 710; see also WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington,
1932) § 2553; ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1934) c. 38, § 160.
136. See, e.g., City of Pineville v. Marshall, 222 Ky. 4, 299 S. W. 1072 (1927)
(ordinance prohibiting wearing of masks on streets, upheld); cf. N. Y. cX rel. Bryant
v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928), aff'g, 241 N. Y. 405, 150 N. E. 497 (1926) (state
statute regulating Ku Klux Klan upheld against attack based on equal protection clause).
137. Cf. American League of Friends of New Germany of Hudson County v. East-
mead, 116 N. J. Eq. 487, 174 Atl. 156 (1934), in which the court denied an injunction
sought by Nazis against police interference with their meetings on the ground that
equity would not aid organizations advocating boycott of Jews, etc. A later applica-
tion, however, was successful. See (1935) 3 I. J. A. BuLL. (No. 8) 3.
138. See CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1920) 180-187.
139. W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1937) § 5913 (prohibits display of "any other
. . . emblem, device, or sign of any nature whatever," etc.); for a similarly worded
law, see WAsH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 2563-7.
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ing in a parade or the display in a public place of red -and in some states
black- flags as symbols indicating opposition to the American form of
government. 14 But the Supreme Court has declared that insofar as such a
statute operates to prohibit the display of a flag as a sign of peacefut opposition
to existing government, it is an unconstitutional restriction on the right of
freedom of expression guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 4
It may be argued that, like flags, Nazi uniforms are merely symbolic of a
particular political creed, and that the state cannot constitutionally prohibit
their use unless emblematic of forceful opposition to existing government.
On the other hand, it may be urged that, unlike a red flag, a uniform per sc
symbolizes force and is a token of military activity.'1  Thus the arguments
may run. A guess may be hazarded that the ultimate judicial decision vill be
conditioned by the popular belief as to the size of the threat which the
particular uniform-wearing organization constitutes to the existing American
form of government.
STrE PARADES
England. It would have been poor technique indeed for Mosley to have
equipped his men with uniforms without displaying the uniforms on parade,
and the Blackshirts frequently indulged in this common form of display.
But the parades often ended in pitched battles.143 Section Three of the Public
Order Act is a frontal attack on this technique.
Prior to the passage of the Act, miscellaneous statutes granted power to
the police in various parts of England to control the route to be taken by
processions. 44 Section Three (1) of the Act is largely a codification of these
140. Compare CAI. PEN. CODE (Deering, 1933) § 403a, with Stromberg v. California,
283 U. S. 359 (1931), rev'g, 106 Cal. App. 725, 290 Pac. 93 (1930) ; Mcff. Pun. Acrs,
1931, No. 328, §48; with People v. Immonen, 271 Mich. 384, 261 N. NV. 59 (1935),
(1935) 4 I. J. A. BuLr. (No. 2) 1; N. Y. PENAL LAW, §2095a with People v. Altman,
241 App. Div. 858, 271 N. Y. Supp. 994 (Ist Dep't 1934). (All of the above cases
involved display of red flags). And see SEN. JT. REs. 191 & -. R. Jr. Rzs. 473, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess., discussed in (1937) 6 I. J. A. Bus.L 35 (joint resolution to limit "flags,
banners, or devices" at meetings near foreign embassies and consulates in the District
of Columbia).
141. Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 369 (1931) (McReynolds & Butler,
JJ., dissented).
142. "Uniformed men in military formation suggest, and are meant to suggest,
the idea of force. . . to be used either now or in the future." Remarks of Mr. Bernays,
reported in 318 I. C. Dan. (5th ser. 1936) 1388.
143. See note 150, infra and note 2, mspra.
144. See Remarks of Sir John Simon, reported in 317 H. C. Dam. (5th ser. 1936)
1359. In the London Metropolitan area, the statute is the Metropolitan Police Act,
1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 47, § 52.
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statutes so as to have them apply uniformly throughout England and Scot-
land.145 It provides that
"if the chief officer of police . . .has reasonable ground for apprehending
that the procession may occasion serious public disorder, he may give direc-
tions imposing . . . such conditions as appear to him necessary for the
preservation of public order . . . "146
Section Three (2), however, grants powers entirely novel.47 It provides
that outside of the Metropolitan Police District if
"the chief officer of police is of opinion that by reason of particular cir-
cumstances existing in any . . . district . . . the powers conferred on
him by .. . [subsection one] will not be sufficient to enable him to prevent
serious public disorder being occasioned by the holding of public processions
in" his district, "he shall apply to the council of the . district for an order
prohibiting for such period not exceeding three months . . .the holding of
all public processions ... _and . . . the council may, with the consent
of a Secretary of State," make the order.
Subsection (3) applies solely to the Metropolitan police district, and pro-
vides that within this area the police are to apply directly to the Secretary of
State for consent to invoke the powers set forth in Subsection (2).
It will be observed that under Subsections (2) and (3), unlike Subsection
(1), the chief of police need not have "reasonable ground" for apprehending
a breach of the peace in order to apply for an order, but need only be of
the "opinion" that a breach will be occasioned. This difference was created,
apparently, in order to prevent an appeal to the courts for an injunction on
the ground that the police officer does not have "reasonable ground" for
his application.' 48 The necessity of securing the consent of the Secretary of
State is some protection against arbitrary police action, since the Secretary's
conduct is subject to criticism in Parliament when that body is in session.
Yet students have strongly questioned the potency of this check upon execu-
tive action.' 49
Subsection (3) was first invoked in June, 1937, when the Home Secretary
approved an order banning a Mosley procession through the Jewish quarter
145. See Remarks of Sir John Simon, cited supra note 144; Remarks of Mr. Dingle
Foot, 318 H. C. DEB. (5th ser. 1936) 1728.
146. The subsection contains the further proviso: "that no conditions restricting
the display of flags, banners, or emblems shall be imposed under this subsection except
such as are reasonably necessary to prevent risk of a breach of the peace."
147. See Remarks of Mr. Dingle Foot, cited supra note 145.
148. "In subsection (1) the Chief Constable forms his opinion and, having formed
it, he acts upon it immediately and there is no one to say him nay . . . But it is
a very different position in subsection (2) . . . After all, his opinion merely sets
a train of events in motion . . . We do not want the organizers of processions to ba
able to get an injunction of some kind preventing action." Remarks of the Marquess
of Duffern & Ava, reported in 103 H. L. DEB. (5th ser. 1936) 879-880
149. See, e.g., Mum, How BRITAiN is GOVERNED (2d ed. 1930) 76-80.
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in the East End of London.150 Following this action, the Secretary stated
that he does not consider "a mere threat of opposition to a proposed political
demonstration as a sufficient ground for prohibiting that demonstration.!" 51
The "circumstances," he said, must be "exceptional." 1M2 All of which is
not a very enlightening standard.
United States. It has previously been noted that American courts have
generally sustained ordinances requiring a permit as a condition precedent
to the holding of a street meeting.'5 Quite different has been the treatment
accorded ordinances requiring permits for street parades. Most of the cases
arose in the last quarter of the nineteenth century and involved parades by
the Salvation Army. In some instances municipalities had exempted from
the operation of the ordinances funerals, fire companies, the national guard,'"
and occasionally also the police and the Grand Army of the Republic ;1,5 and,
in one case, any "political party having a regular state organization."51
These exemptions dearly revealed the true purpose of the ordinances. With
the customary exception of Massachusetts, 5 7 ordinances containing such
exemptions have been condemned as unreasonable and as a denial of the
equal protection of the laws.158 But even where the obnoxious exemptions
were not present, the majority of appellate courts have declared stich or-
150. See The Times, June 22, 1937, p. 16, col. f The Blackshirts were, however,
permitted to parade in other parts of London. Nevertheless, police attempts to protect
them from counter-demonstrations have often failed. See N. Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1937,
p. 1, col. 2; id., Oct. 11, 1937, p. 1, cols. 4-5. The Home Office is now said to be
convinced that such demonstrations "were principally the work of undesirable aliens."
See N. Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1937, p. 18, col. 3.
151. See The Times, June 29, 1937, p. 21, col. b.
152. Ibid.
153. See p. 413, supra.
154. See ordinance discussed in Anderson v. Wellington, 40 Kan. 173, 19 Pac. 719
(1888) (Salvation Army parade-ordinance declared unreasonable).
155. See ordinance discussed in Commonwealth v. Mervis, 55 Pa. Super. 178 (1913)
(but case involved meeting, not a parade-ordinance declared invalid as discriminatory).
But cf. Commonwealth v. Curtis, 55 Pa. Super. 184 (1913) (ordinance upheld, excepted
organizations having been omitted from amended ordinance). The political affiliation
of the defendant is not given in either case.
156. See ordinance discussed in State ex re. Garrabad v. Deming, 84 Wis. 585,
54 N. NV. 1104 (1893) (Salvation Army parade-ordinance held to violate equal protec-
tion clause).
157. See Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148 Mass. 375, 19 N. F. 224 (1839) (Salvation
Army parade-police "rule" upheld under grant of authority to regulate "itinerant
musicians" though rule excepted funeral or military parades and processions by a political,
a "civic, or charitable organization for which a police escort is provided.") And see
supra, notes 58 and 61.
158. See cases cited supra notes 154, 155 and 156.
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dinances unreasonable because they delegate uncontrolled discretion to the
licensing official. 1 9
This apparent difference between the judicial treatment accorded or-
dinances regulating street meetings and parades invites speculation. One
ingenious though unconvincing rationalization has been suggested for the
distinction.160 It is argued that a procession is "prima facie lawful," for,
since "A, B, and C have each separately the right to pass and repass on the
highway, there is nothing illegal in their doing so in concert."' 10 The test
of legality of any particular procession, therefore, is whether it "is a reason-
able user of the highway, and not merely whether it causes an obstruction." 1
02
The distinction in the United States may perhaps be explained on the
ground that the parade cases have generally involved Salvation Army proces-
sions, 163 while the meeting cases have frequently involved Socialists or Com-
munists. 64 Another possible explanation is that the possibility for discrim-
ination is more apparent to the judges in the ordinances requiring permits for
parades. Thus, even where the ordinance applies to all parades, regardless
of the sponsoring organization, the argument recurs in the opinions that
parades by lodges, fraternal societies, veterans' associations, and the like,
have always been permitted; and that, therefore, it is unreasonable to grant
arbitrary power to deny the privilege of parading to any organization.'00 But
when the judges approach ordinances regulating street meetings, their sense
of fair play is not necessarily stimulated. For generally, accepted organiza-
159. Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. W. 72 (1886) (Salvation Army parade
-the leading case); Chicago v. Trotter, 136 Ill. 430, 26 N. E. 359 (1891); Rich v.
Naperville, 42 Ill. App. 222, (1891) (Salvation Army parade). Contra: Sullivan v.
Shaw, 6 F. Supp. 112 (S. D. Cal. 1934) (parade by United Front Conference against
Hunger-ordinance held constitutional); Price v. Los Angeles (1935) 4 I. J. A. BULL.
(No. 3) 5 (Cal. Super. 1935) (demurrer sustained to petition for mandamus to compel
issuance of permit for parade by May Day Conference Ass'n).
160. See Goodhart, Public Meetings & Processions (1937) 6 CAmD. L. J. 161.
Although Professor Goodhart's rationalization was concerned only with English law,
it would seem equally applicable to the United States. Lowdens v. Keaveney [19031
2 Ir. R. 82 seems to be the only reported British case definitely making the point that
a procession, as distinguished from a meeting, on the streets may be prima fade lawful.
See id., at 89, 90. The distinction is made more frequently in the United States. See
cases cited infra note 166.
161. Goodhart, supra note 160, at 169.
162. Id., at 171.
163. See cases cited mpra notes 154, 156, and 159.
164. See cases cited snpra notes 59, and 62; and see Bloomington v. Richardson,
38 Ill. App. 66 (1890), where the court held an ordinance requiring a permit to hold
a "public meeting" in the streets inapplicable to a meeting of the Salvation Army on
the ground that it was not a "public meeting."
165. See People ex. rel. Cartmill v. Rochester, 44 Hun 166, 169-70 (5th Dep't
N. Y., 1887); it re Gribben, 5 Okla. 379, 392, 47 Pac. 1074, 107 (1897) (Salvation
Army parade-ordinance prohibiting "noise upon streets . . . by means of drums or
musical instruments or otherwise" [Id., at 380-1, 47 Pac. at 1075] held unreasonable).
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tions, with the exception of the Salvation Army, do not desire to hold street
meetings; they can usually affbrd to hire a hail.30
CONCLUSION
Few generalized comparisons of the right of public assembly in England
and America are worth making other than those that by this time should
be obviofis. The legal techniques for controlling street meetings are similar
in both countries, but regulation of private armies and Fascist organizations
is far more extensive in England than in America.
It may be true that control of private a'rmies has curbed Fascism in Great
Britain without impinging on free speech. But statesmen may find that any
ultimately successful policy must be based upon an examination into the
fundamental causes of British fascism. Highly speculative though this exam-
ination may be, it would seem prerequisite to any permanent solution of the
problems presented by Mosley's rise. "Down with the Jews," may be the
cry- however misdirected- of a people in distress; a cry not to be per-
manently eliminated by repressive laws conceived in fear.
To those who wish to preserve free speech, more pressing problems are
presented by the limitations on the right of public assembly, for the ctimu-
lative effect of these restrictions is serious. Repression of this sort is sought
to be justified by the plea that it is necessary to maintain the public order.
Some restrictions are necessary to curtail conduct which actually interferes
with the public safety, but these measures are frequently used where the
threat of disturbance is remote. In the long run the public order may best
be served by risking a little disorder. To let off steam may scorch the
ceiling; it does not blow off the roof.
Several proposals for reform recur. It is sometimes urged that all dis-
cretion be taken away from the law-enforcing agencies. 07 The suggestion
166. This rationale is, perhaps, illustrated by two cases, both arising in Michigan.
The first, decided in 1886, involved an unlicensed parade by the Salvation Army. The
ordinance was held unreasonable. Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396, 30 N. IV. 72 (1826),
cited supra note 159. Fifteen years later, the same court had before it an ordinance
prohibiting public addresses in the streets without a license. The accused was described
as a "gospel preacher!' The court upheld the oidinance, stating, without further ration-
alization, that there was an obvious distinction between a "stationary assemblage" and a
"moving procession." Love v. Phelan, 128 Mich. 545, 549, 87 N. NV. 785, 787 (1901)
(The court relied on a statement in the Frazee case, Lmpra, at 407, 30 N. WV. at 76).
See also People ex rel. Cartmill v. Rochester, 44 Hun 166, 169 (5th Dep't N. Y., 1887)
(procession in street "not necessarily a nuisance."); Shields v. State, 187 Wis. 448,
204 N. W. 486, 40 A. L. R. 945 (1925) (K. K. K. masked parade-defendant policeman
convicted of assault since parade not unlawful per re).
Pennsylvania courts, however, apparently make no distinction between street parades
and meetings. See cases cited supra note 155.
167. See, e.g., Jennings, supra note 16, at 7; Comment (1935) 23 CAMIF. L Rv.
180, 192.
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is futile. Every statute, every ordinance must look to men for its interpreta-
tion. But this study has indicated that the wording of statutes does have
some significance. It might therefore be helpful to attempt to tighten up
those statutes seeking to maintain the public order. 108 Within broad limits
a standard of conduct can be described which should be extremely difficult
to twist or distort. But a word can have only that meaning which a man
imports to it.
There is of course some hope that the law-enforcing agencies might be
induced to use their discretion more wisely. The American policeman might
at least be taught to follow the example of his English contemporary by
discarding some of his more brutal tactics. And judges might be educated
to be frankly suspicious of police administration in civil liberties cases. But
these vague hopes are hardly likely to be achieved.
The abuse of discretion by the police has led to another recurring proposal.
In the words of an Englishman, "the most important single problem of
civil liberty in England today is to secure the control by democracy of the
police."' 169 If by "democracy" is meant the majority, this suggestion is
illusory. The majority has never desired civil liberties save for itself. Thus
the guaranties of civil liberty contained in our Constitution have never with-
stood major attacks. The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, the hysteria of
the Reconstruction Days, the World War, and the post-war legislation have
all taken their toll, unabashed by constitutional restrictions and unhindered
by court action. True, there are the recent victories of some of the Scottsboro
boys, and of Herndon, De Jonge and Miss Stromberg, but they stand in the
very shadow of such cases as those of Gitlow, Abrams, Debs and Miss
Whitney. 70 There is no reason to doubt that the repressive activities of the
police in England and the United States have the support of the majority.
Nevertheless, there remains the hope that at least the more flagrant abuses
can be curbed by a minority dedicated to the task of reminding a democracy
of its pledge as articulated in the Bill of Rights.
168. In "preventing breaches of the peace or bringing to an end an actual disturbance
' the police are better served by the common law-with all its elasticity and
adaptibility-than they would be by any rigid statutory code." The Police and the Law
(1936) 9 POLICE J. 11, 19.
169. Bing, Civil Liberty (1937) 19 LABOUR MONTHLY 296.
170. (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 862.
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